Confessional Appetites and
Taif in Post-War Lebanon
Nawaf Salam
The war that broke out in 1975 in Lebanon reflected the brittleness of the consensus among the various Lebanese sects (Wifaq) as well as the failure of the Lebanese power- sharing formula (Sigha) to accommodate the social and demographic changes that the country witnessed in the 1960s and 1970s. But it is impossible to fully comprehend the course of this protracted crisis and the attempts to resolve it without taking into account Lebanon's turbulent environment and the role of external factors in its conflict.(1)
The role external factors played in the conflict is reflected in the deadly dialectic of Lebanese protagonists' search for outside support to strengthen their domestic positions against local rivals and of foreign actors' exploitation of Lebanon's internal divisions to enhance their regional power. Lebanon was thus gradually transformed into a battlefield of regional and international rivalries. Besides the fall-out from the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syrian-Egyptian, Iraqi-Syrian, and Syrian-Palestinian quarrels were fought out on Lebanese territory by Lebanese proxies. Moreover, between 1982 and 1985 Lebanon became a warm spot of superpower competition. This is not to mention how internal disputes of foreign countries were also played out in Beirut in the late 1980s, e. g. that between "extremist" and "moderate" factions in the Iranian government.
At the same time, external factors could be seen to bear on the possible solution and/or containment of the conflict as of its early stages. Thus, the general hostilities in 1975-76 were ended by resolutions of the 1976 Arab summits of Riyadh and Cairo, which formalized a Saudi-sponsored Syrian-Egyptian reconciliation and provided a framework for deploying an Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon.
The Taif accord, or Document of National Entente,(2) adopted by the Lebanese deputies meeting in Saudi Arabia in 1989 is striking evidence of how intertwined the internal and external dimensions of the Lebanese conflict had become. Although domestic reforms are the cornerstone of the Taif agreement, the agreement would never have seen light had it not included clauses regulating Lebanese-Syrian relations and provisions on policies to end Israel's occupation of South Lebanon.
The agreement was, indeed, predicated on the readiness of the Lebanese adversaries - exhausted and finally aware that none of them could achieve a decisive victory - to compromise. Moreover, with the failure to elect a new president to succeed Amin Gemayel, Lebanon faced, for the first time since 1975, constitutional deadlock with two rival governments. But Taif was also made possible by the concurrence of a series of favorable external changes.
First, Palestinian influence in Lebanon had been weakened by the Israeli invasion of 1982, which drove the bulk of PLO armed forces out of Beirut and the South, the confrontation between the remaining Palestinian troops and the Syrian army in the north and the Bekaa valley, and the "battle of the camps" between the Palestinians and the Amal movement.
Second, Israel scaled back its objectives owing to the failure of the 17 May 1983 accord with Lebanon and, after 1987, the need to focus on the Palestinian Intifada.
Third, Syria's position in Lebanon had been reinforced; in particular, its army was back in Beirut after having had to pull out in the wake of the Israeli invasion of 1982. However, Syria now had to compete with an Iraq seeking, after its war with Iran, to develop a power base in Lebanon by supporting the Lebanese Forces and the Awn government, which had declared a "war of liberation" against Syria. This facilitated Syria's acceptance at the 1989 Casablanca Arab Summit of the formation of the Higher Arab Tripartite Committee consisting of Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco, which was en trusted with finding a solution to the Lebanese crisis.
Last but not least, the radically new policies adopted by the Soviet Union under Gorbachev reduced superpower tensions in the Middle East.(3)
Owing to these external changes, the Taif Agreement was able to modify the rules of the internal game in Lebanon. First and foremost, it permitted the silencing of the guns. It also initiated a political process that helped rescue the constitutional institutions by enabling parliament to meet and formally endorse the text of the Agreement, which was the precondition for presidential elections and the formation of a unitary government. The army was also reunified and the militias disbanded - though this did not apply to Hizballah, which benefited from a "special treatment due to the Israeli occupation of parts of southern Lebanon. As a result, the major obstacles that had hindered for years the free movement of the Lebanese within their country and had virtually divided its territory were removed.
However, the restoration of full state authority was still predicated on external conditions since Taif called for the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from Israel's self-declared "security zone" in South Lebanon through the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 425.(4)
The agreement also provided for the redeployment of Syrian troops in Lebanon to the Bekaa Valley, and "if necessary, to other locations to be agreed upon by a joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee" within a period not exceeding two years from the formation of a government of National Reconciliation and the passing of constitutional reforms.(5) No reference was made to the withdrawal of Syrian troops, only to the fact that their "size and duration" in Lebanon is a matter that will have to be agreed upon between the governments of the two countries. As a translation of "Lebanon's Arab identity and affiliation", Lebanese Syrian relations are considered "privileged" and based on the "principle of cooperation and coordination" that should materialize in the conclusion of bilateral agreement in "all domains".(6)
Regarding the presence of Palestinian refugees, the rejection of their permanent re settlement in Lebanon was elevated to a constitutional provision.(7)
Obviously, fulfillment of these preconditions for restoring the full authority of the state as well as territorial sovereignty was not in Lebanese hands. It was contingent upon external factors and developments related mainly to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also to other elements of the broader regional balance of power, such as the role of Iran. Hence, without significant progress in the Middle East peace process, the authority of the Lebanese state would not be fully restored or the internal reforms agreed to in Taif fully implemented. Moreover, such implementation depended increasingly on Syria's growing influence in Lebanon, especially after the US-Syrian rapprochement that followed Syria's support for the anti-Iraq coalition in the Gulf War and its agreement to take part in the Madrid Peace Conference and subsequent bilateral negotiations.
It is also important to note here that the deputies meeting in Taif were unable to amend to these sections of the Accord - unlike those dealing with domestic reforms. They were the outcome of international and regional negotiations primarily between Syria and the members of the Arab Tripartite Committee. The Lebanese deputies had the choice between adopting them word for word and jeopardizing the whole agreement.
In addition to the price of remaining in a "suspended sovereignty" condition, proceeding with the Taif deal had required a domestic cost as well. To persuade the Lebanese warlords to accept the agreement, they had to be granted a substantial slice of the new political pie. Hence, Taif's provision empowering the government, contrary to all basic democratic principles, to appoint deputies to the vacant parliamentary seats of de ceased members arid to new seats created to establish parity between Christians and Muslims.(8) One cannot but note here that since 1976 all attempts to end the Lebanese war that did not offer the militia chieftains a substantial stake in the projected postwar order or ignored Syria's interests in Lebanon failed dramatically and paved the way for another round of violence.(9)
Inasmuch as Taif was an expression of the interrelation between the external and internal dimensions of the conflict, the section on domestic reforms - a result of a give and take process of compromise - was itself a "package deal". Its subsections are mutually dependent and only make sense in the context of their broader framework, based on the principle of measure for measure. Moreover, certain articles of the Accord, such as those in the preamble, stand out as expressions of the same underlying logic of symmetry and reciprocity.
As to the contents of the accord, most of its provisions could be found in preceding documents. As a matter of fact, Taif incorporates many compromise formulae already drawn up in previous texts such as the Constitutional Document (1976), the Principles of Entente (1980), the Lausanne Paper (1984), the Policy Statement of the National Unity Government (1984), and the Tripartite Agreement (1985).
The Accord is a reworking of the blueprint submitted to the deputies meeting in Taif by the Higher Arab Tripartite committee (1989). The latter, for its part, drew heavily on the following four reform drafts: the "Main Principles for Solving the Lebanese Crisis" agreed on in the Salem-Shar' Discussions in Damascus (1987), the Hariri Working Paper that elaborated on the latter (1987), the U.S. "Non-Paper" of April Glaspie (1988), and the joint Husseini-Hoss Proposal (1989).(10)
Therefore, while the crucial "package deal" approach to the Taif Agreement is innovative, the reform elements of that package, as Joseph Maila pertinently points out in his early commentary on the agreement, are not.(11) Moreover, at an ideological level, Taif has been criticized and rejected by many Lebanese for falling short of their ideal model of political organization and/or their perception of the reforms needed for Lebanon.
For example, Taif satisfied neither those who had pleaded for a federal solution for Lebanon nor the advocates of the principle of "one person, one vote". On the other hand, as it was a compromise reached under a given domestic and regional balance of power, none of the Lebanese parties could, by definition, identify fully with its terms.
It remains that Taif constitutes a major political turning point in the history of independent Lebanon because of the importance of changes it introduced in the Lebanese political system through constitutional reforms. And just as the internal aspects of Taif cannot be comprehended in isolation from the external dimensions of the conflict, so the relevance of Taif's constitutional reforms cannot be grasped from a pure legal perspective. They need to be understood in the context of the underlying sectarian balance of power and interpreted in accordance with the prevailing sectarian political culture.
In fact, the relationship between the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary, the respective prerogatives and the powers enjoyed by the respective officeholders, and the structures and functions of the main institutions and agencies of state are less an expression of general constitutional principles than a reflection of the distribution of power among the various sects, the identity and strength of the parties by whom they are represented, and the alliances they make, whether inside or outside Lebanon. Yet, given the fact that such equations and relationship are taken into account when constitutional rules are drafted and no less when it comes to how they are applied - witness the sectarian allocation of the three highest offices of state-, it is still a useful exercise to analyze the post-Taif constitutional amendments. Four points warrant special attention.
First, the highly controversial issue of Lebanon's identity which had much divided the Lebanese and inflamed many ideological debates as of the inception of modern Lebanon finds a "consensual" recast in Articles (a) and (b) of the preamble to the amended constitution. The new formula is based on balanced parallelism. While Lebanon is declared "a final homeland for all its sons", its "Arab identity and affiliation" is also confirmed. By virtue of this definition, Muslims are deemed committed to Lebanon per Se, not as a transient entity pending the establishment of a single pan-Arab state or the unification of the Islamic Umma. Similarly, Christians are presumed to accept that the Lebanese state be bound in its policies and obligations by the requirements of a shared Arab destiny.(12)
Second, Taif operates a "novation" of the confessional political system. It maintains the same old game, but updates its rules. On the one hand, Taif affirms the religious sects as the basic constituent units of the system; the legitimizing principle of the republic remains, as in the unwritten Pact of 1943,(13) that of a communal "social contract". However, this is now solemnly enshrined in Article "j" of the preamble to the amended constitution, which reads: "Constitutional legitimacy shall not be extended to any authority that contradicts the pact of coexistence". On the other hand, Taif purports - often indirectly - to redefine confessional representation and prerogatives in all the main institutions of state with the objective of achieving a more balanced and equitable formula for confessional power-sharing.
Paradoxical though it may seem, to enhance the stability of the new confessional formula, Taif provides for an institutional process to deal with the controversial issue of deconfessionalization by calling on the first parliament to be elected to form a "National Committee" to "study and propose the means to ensure the abolition of confessional ism".(14) In reality, this essentially means adjourning the issue of deconfessionalization "ad Calendas Libanicas", as Theodor Hanf elegantly remarks,(15) for neither an agenda nor a time frame for said committee has been set.
Third, the main features of the new power-sharing formula can be summarized as follows. Executive powers formerly constitutionally vested in their entirety in the president of the republic, but in fact substantially restricted by tradition, are transferred to the council of ministers as a collegial body(16) in which confessional groups are to be "represented in an equitable manner" pursuant to Article 95 of the constitution.
The principle of confessional collegiality is further reinforced by the new provisions of Article 65 of the constitution, which specify that "the legal quorum for a Council (of ministers) meeting shall be a two-thirds majority of its members. It shall make its decisions by consensus. If that is not possible, it shall make its decisions by vote of the majority of attending members. Fundamental issues shall require the approval of two-thirds of the government named in the decree of formation".'
The president, by tradition a Maronite Christian, acting now as a head of state, retained, however, considerable powers of quasi-arbitration. He can still veto a bill passed by parliament and request its reconsideration. In this case, he is not required to promulgate it as law until it "has been discussed again and approved by an absolute majority of all the members legally composing the Chamber."(18) Even in this case, the president has the right to submit the matter to the scrutiny of the Constitutional Council.(19) Although not a member of the council of ministers, he may nevertheless attend and preside over its meetings, participate in its deliberations - but without the right to vote - and submit to it any "urgent matter" that is not on its agenda.(20) Bound to promulgate and publish the decrees taken by the council of ministers within a period of 15 days, he may nonetheless ask the latter to reconsider its decision, but once upheld he can no longer block its entry into force.(21) Although the president is now bound by the results of parliamentary consultations in designating the president of the council of ministers,(22) he plays a crucial role in the composition of the latter, since the promulgation of the decree for its formation requires the "agreement" of both the designated president of the council and the president of the republic.(23) Finally, the moral authority of the president, as head of state, allows him to provide critical guidance, as he may "address, when necessary, messages to the Chamber of Deputies."(24)
In sum, the President's powers have been reduced, but his remaining powers are cer tainly not "inconsequential". Nor has he been "completely cornered", left without "even the choice of putting up or shutting up."(25) Similarly, it would go too far to describe his functions as "largely ceremonial."(26)
As noted earlier, powers have been transferred from the president of the republic to the council of ministers as a collegium, not to its president. Yet, the latter's position, traditionally held by a Sunni Muslim, is strengthened by virtue of the fact that he now pre sides over an institution vested with executive powers. By comparison, under the pre Taif constitution, whenever the cabinet used to convene under the chairmanship of the prime minister, it did so as a ministerial council (majlis wizari), which could not act in even routine matters, but only prepare the meeting of the council of ministers, which was presided over by the president of the republic and as such did constitute an organ empowered to make decisions. In the words of Edmond Rabbath, the former, i. e., the majlis wizari, was but "a form of reunion", not an institution.(27)
The position of the president of the council of ministers has also been strengthened by the Taif Agreement which gives constitutional force to the prerogatives he had previously exercised by force of tradition. In addition, and most importantly, he now sets the agenda of meetings and is responsible for supervising the implementation of decisions of the council of ministers.(28)
The position of speaker of parliament - traditionally a Shi'i - has been considerably enhanced as well. His mandate has been extended from one to four years. It cannot be terminated but once at the end of the second year by a two-thirds majority of the Chamber.(29) Enjoying greater security of office, the speaker now presides over a parliament whose stability has also been enhanced, as the executive can no longer dissolve it, except in four unlikely instances.(30)
In the pre-Taif era, the balance between the executive and the legislative powers was tipped in favor of the former. Taif reversed this situation - rather than established equilibrium. As a matter of fact, it is an established principle of constitutional theory that in parliamentary regimes the government's answerability to parliament and the latter's capacity to bring it down by a vote of no confidence are counterbalanced by the executive's ability to dissolve parliament. In French jurisprudence this principle is known as that of "moyens d'action réciproques entre gouvernement et parlement".
The prerogatives of parliament have been strengthened as well. As already noted, the president of the republic has become bound by the result of his consultation with members of parliament on whom to nominate as president of the council of ministers. The president of the republic is also required to inform the speaker of this result and to consult with him on the matter.(31) Likewise, the legislative role of parliament is reinforced through an amendment to Article 55 of the constitution, whereby bills that the council of ministers deems "urgent" can no longer be put in to effect by decree 40 days after being sent to parliament if parliament has not acted upon them, unless they are placed on its agenda and read in a public session.
Taif also provided for a change in the composition of parliament from a 6 to 5 ratio in favor of Christians to parity between Muslims and Christians and for a new electoral law in which the territorially larger and confessionally mixed Muhafazats (or governorates) serve as electoral districts.(32)
Fourth, and finally, Taif provided for the strengthening of the independence of the judiciary,(33) administrative decentralization,(34) and the creation of a Constitutional Council,(35) and a Socio-Economic Council.
Taif's implementation was delayed mainly because of General Awn's radical opposition to the Accord. However, in the wake of the Gulf Crisis, Syrian troops backed by Lebanese army units removed him from the presidential palace in Baabda. The regional effects of the Gulf crisis and the changes in the domestic balance of power after Awn's ouster could not but affect the course of Tail's implementation.(37)
"Implementation" is perhaps a misnomer. Although the Taif reforms were translated into 31 constitutional amendments, which were approved by parliament in August 1990, many have still not entered into force. This has undermined the nature of the Accord as a package deal." Other reforms have been either twisted at the implementation stage or later distorted in practice.
Key reforms that have not been implemented include:
- the decentralization of administration,
- the strengthening of the independence of the judiciary,
- the formation of the National Committee entrusted with the task to 'study and propose the means to ensure the abolition of confessionalism", and,
- most importantly, the promulgation of a new electoral law in which electoral districts coincide with Muhafazats.
The last point demonstrates how twisted a fundamental Taif provision has become once implemented as well as how detrimental its effects could accordingly be.
The 1992 parliament, the first elected after Taif, reflected the agreed change in communal representation from a 6 to 5 ratio in favor of the Christians to parity between Christian and Muslim deputies. While this necessarily implied an increase in the number of seats from 99 to 108 pursuant to the provisions of Taif,(38) the electoral law governing these elections raised the figure further to 128. This was clearly designed to en able a greater number of representatives of the war and postwar new "elite" to enter parliament. And whereas Taif had called for elections to be held at the regional level of the Muhafazat, hoping that this would encourage coalitions across local and sectarian boundaries and hence foster national reconciliation, the 1992 electoral law adopted a hybrid system; in the predominantly Shi'i South two Muhafazat(s) were combined to form one electoral district, while in the predominantly Christian Muhafazat of Mount Lebanon, the qada(s), districts at the sub-governorate level, served as electoral districts. Apportionment was even less uniform in the Muhafazat of the Bekaa Valley: one electoral district was based on a qada, while the others were made up of two qadas. Only in Beirut and in North Lebanon was the Muhafazat adopted as the defining electoral unit.(39)
As is well known, such anomalies led to the boycott of these elections by a large - and predominantly, though not solely Christian - segment of the population. Participation was estimated at 30.34%, the lowest level ever in Lebanese parliamentary elections.(40) The genuine representativeness of this first post-Taif parliament was thereby in doubt from the day of its election.
The obvious need to redress such a situation was, however, frustrated by the self serving interests of the 1992 deputies, combined with Syria's regional concern in asserting its influence in Lebanon, especially after Likud's Netanyahu victory in Israel.
As it turned out, the old/new 1996 electoral law maintained the same hybrid pattern of electoral districting as that of 1992. Mount Lebanon voted in qada-based electoral districts, which divided the predominantly Christian electorate and helped to secure the reelection of the Druze leader, Walid Joumblat, and his candidates. The two Muhafazats of South Lebanon were again treated as one electoral district, thus favoring the alliance of Amal's leader, Speaker Nabih Bern, and Hizbullah over its Shi'i opponents.(41)
The Constitutional Council declared the law unconstitutional because it violated the principle of equality among Lebanese. The government, however, responded by insist ing that the law would be implemented as initially presented. But it did add a clause stating that exceptions to the rule of uniform electoral districts based on Muhafazats were "for this one time only". The 2000 electoral law, however, was no less hybrid than that of 1996, and therefore still in violation of the constitution. Significantly, in the 1996 parliament it proved impossible to find the ten deputies required to bring the matter be fore the Constitutional Council.
Evaluating the results of the post-Taif elections in Lebanon in terms of the functions generally attributed by political scientists to legislative elections in democratic regimes, we come to the following conclusions.
First, with regard to the key function of legitimizing the system and its participants, the Lebanese elections failed rather than succeeded:
- they were held under unconstitutional electoral laws;
- significant segments of the population continued to boycott them, though decreasing in size with each election; and
- the government was accused by a number of leading civil society organizations and respected columnists, not to mention candidates, of blatantly ignoring the norms and requirements of neutrality and independence.
Second, the elections failed to improve political stability. Excluding the opposition from state institutions or only allowing opposition forces minimal representation within these institutions has nowhere proved to be a good recipe for stability in the long run. There is nothing to suggest that Lebanon will prove an exception to this golden rule.
Third, elections are supposed to offer citizens the possibility of choosing change in the form of different people and policies. This is only true if elections are genuinely competitive, but this is not the case if candidacies and electoral alliances are subject to limits and ceilings, which deprive the voters or any real choice, as happened in many districts in all three elections, in 1992, 1996 and 2000. Elite circulation was thus seriously impeded and the possibility of change frustrated.
Finally, if the goal of elections is to represent the views of the voters as closely as possible, an electoral system based on simple majorities in large multimember districts (up to 28 seats in the Muhafazat of North Lebanon) is inadequate for this purpose.
In fact, the greater the number of seats per district, the more likely that plurality sys tems will distort results.(42) (This is why in e.g. senate elections French electoral law pro vides for a shift from simple majority to proportional representation when the number of seats in any district exceeds five.)
As to how reforms which were "implemented" have been distorted by ensuing practices, the case is best illustrated by the dysfunctions of the council of ministers as a collegium. The underlying objective in transferring executive powers to the council of ministers was to offer an equitable solution to the question of confessional power-sharing. But while Taif's fine-tuning of the sectarian balance helped contain sectarian violence, it could not at the same time temper sectarian jealousies because what was at stake was but a new division of the sectarian pie. More than ever before, ministers felt obliged to act as guardians of the particular interests of their communities or at least to appear to be doing so before their respective communal constituencies. They could not form a team capable of formulating a common policy or of carrying it out, whenever it seemed as if they were able to do so.
Some ten years before the outbreak of war in 1975, Malcolm Kerr observed that governments in Lebanon were "not made to create public policy ... but to reflect faithfully and adjust the competing interests of various groups."(43) He judiciously added that Lebanese politics exists only in Lasswell's limited sense of 'who gets what, when, and how', as a competition for the honors and spoils of office. Within that sense its existence is a thriving one; but there is no room for politics in the more full-blooded sense of the competition for power to create and impose new policies."(44) More than ten years after the end of the war, it is difficult to find better words to describe the nature of government or the scope of politics in Lebanon, in spite of the radical Taif constitutional amendments regarding the prerogatives and role of government.
Furthermore, engaged in fierce competition for patronage and benefits, ministers seldom feel bound by the constitutional principle of "collective responsibility". As a matter of fact, in the post-Taif era there have been numerous instances of ministers publicly criticizing the composition of the cabinet to which they belong, condemning positions taken by their colleagues, disapproving of the actions of the president of the council of ministers, denouncing the general orientation of the cabinet, or even boycotting cabinet meetings for certain periods of time without feeling the need to resign or being forced to do so.
In brief, the council of ministers as a constitutional collegium has been incapable of becoming a policy-making - or even a decision-making - body. In practice its functions have often been assumed by a non-constitutional power-sharing "troika" of the three presidents, i.e. the president of the republic, the president of the council of ministers and the speaker of parliament, acting simultaneously as representatives of their respective communities and as holders of constitutional office. But it has been still difficult for this "troika" to rule effectively, as its members were constantly quarrelling over their respective shares of the pie, particularly in matters of civil service appointments and public appropriations. To function, the system often needed external arbitration, and no party was better prepared or had a greater vested interest in assuming - or continuing to exercise - this role than Syria.
Based on his experience as minister of defense and of information, respectively, in the first two post-Taif cabinets, former deputy Albert Mansour writes in his Al-in qilab 'ala al-Ta (Coup against Taif):
"All important and fundamental decisions were made outside the council of ministers, and later presented to it for ratification. As a matter of fact, decisions were not only made outside the council of ministers, but in place of it."(45)
Moreover, let us note here that the same factors that have determined Lebanese politics and hampered the functioning of government as a collegium have also prevented members of the opposition from forming national - as opposed to sectarian - alliances and formulating concrete programs of action.
Implemented in an eclectic and twisted manner, Taif itself became a source of new imbalances that could not but further increase sectarian suspicions. This is reflected not only - though perhaps most clearly - in the Christian so-called ihbat, a negative attitude based more on frustration with the Taif process than mere disenchantment with its out come. It is the result of the cumulative effects of Awn's forced exile, Dany Chamoun's assassination, Samir Geagea's trial, obstacles and delays in the return of displaced people, the lack of transparency in the criteria of the massive grant of Lebanese citizenship by decree, the conditions surrounding the 1992 elections, and, above all, the non- redeployment of Syrian troops in 1992.(46)
Though it is true that the position of the president of the council of ministers has been substantially strengthened, Sunni leaders remain greatly concerned about the fact that the president of the republic appears reluctant to come to terms with his new role as head of state and continues to attend, and hence to preside over, most cabinet meetings. They fear that such a recurrent practice may with time turn into a new custom. Their sectarian jealousies were further aroused first by President Hrawi's call in 1996 for new constitutional amendments and later by President Lahoud's controversial style and his creation of a special unit at the presidential palace to monitor the day-to-day management of affairs in the various ministries. The result was a Sunni malaise, which was the main reason for the dramatic defeat of Salim Hoss, the president of the council of ministers, in the 2000 legislative elections, the first time in modem Lebanese history that an incumbent prime minister has failed to win a parliamentary seat.
Hopes that the redefinition of the prerogatives of parliament and its speaker, and the greater stability granted to both, would satisfy Shi'i's demands have not been borne out. Shi'i leaders continue to demand for their community a quasi-executive position with veto power comparable to that of the Maronite head of state and the Sunni president of the council of ministers, i.e., the post of minister of finance, as the latter's signature is mandatory for almost all decrees. This is not to mention Hizbullah's rejection of the whole confessional system as such for "ideological" reasons.
Besides heightening the sectarian suspicions of the three main sects, the dialectic of confessional jealousies generated by the Taif process has created a situation in which three other smaller sects are no longer satisfied with their constitutionally guaranteed participation in the council of ministers, in spite of the fact that Taif had vested the latter as a collegium with all executive power. Each of these three sects has thus been asking for its own turf. Hence, the Greek Orthodox demand that the prerogatives of the vice- president of the council of ministers be defined in law, and the Greek Catholics demand the pemianent presidency of the Socio-Economic Council. And long before Taif the Druze had been demanding the creation of a senate, in which they would hold the presidency.
In his critique of Lijphart's revised model of consociational democracy, renamed consensus democracy, Sartori warned:
"By facilitating something you make it happen. The more you give in, the more you are asked to give. And what is not discouraged becomes in fact encouraged. If you reward divisions and divisiveness (...) you increase and eventually heighten divisions and divisiveness. In the end then, Li machinery may well engender more con sensus-breaking than consensus-making."(47)
In the case of Lebanon, the danger is that the Taif model, which was meant to neutralize "the centrifugal forces of society", might instead have put Lebanon on "a one-way slope that leads to a self-reinforcing system" of confessional appetites.(48)
Taif succeeded in containing sectarian violence, but it has also reinforced sectarianism. Designed to rebalance Lebanon's power-sharing formula, its implementation has kept Lebanon off balance. Furthermore, post-Taif no less than pre-Taif, Lebanon's future appears predicated on external factors.
Remarkable though Taif was in silencing the guns, a distorted, partially implemented Taif failed to put Lebanon on track to build a state. In view of the experience of the past decade, it is doubtful whether this can now be achieved just by putting Taif back on track.
Notes:
(1) On the origins, course and interpretations of the war, see Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (Oxford and London: Centre for Lebanese Studies and Tauris 1993); Samir Kassir, La guerre du Liban. De la dissension nationale au conflit regional (1975-1982) (Paris: Karthala 1994); Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, 1979); Farid EI-Khazen, The Break down of the State in Lebanon, 1967-1976 (London: Tauris, 2000); Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon, a Shattered Country: Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1996); and Kamal Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War. Lebanon 1958-1976 (N.Y.: Caravan, 1976).
(2) On the Taif accord, see Al-Markaz al-Lubnani lil-dirasat (collective work), Wathiqat al-wifaq al watani. Muraja'a naqdiyya wataniyya (Beirut 2001); Arif al-Abid, Lubnan wa-l Taif Taqatu' tarikhi wa masar ghayr muktamil (Beirut 2001); Judith Palmer Hank, "Democracy (Again) Derailed: Lebanon's Ta'if Paradox", in Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen and Paul Noble, Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World, Vol.2 (Comparative Experiences) (Boulder: Rienner, 1998); Hassan Krayyem, "The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement", in Paul Salem (ed.), Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1997); Joseph Maila, The Document of National Understanding: A Commentary (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1992); and Paul Salem (translator and annotator) "The New Constitution of Lebanon and the Taif Agreement", in The Beirut Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1991).
(3) See Arif al-Abid, op. cit., pp. 132-141 and 193-217; and Hassan Krayyem, op. cit., pp. 418- 421.
(4) See Wathiqat al-wifaq al-watani al-lubnani, Beirut 1990, Section 3.
(5) Idem, Section 2.
(6) Idem, Section 4.
(7) Idem, Section 1, Part 1, paragraph I.
(8) Idem, Section 1, Part 2, Article A, paragraph 6.
(9) See Hani A. Fans, "The Failure of Peacemaking in Lebanon, 1975-1989", in Deidre Collings (ed), Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction (Boulder: Rienner, 1994). (10) See Arifal-Abid, op. cit., pp. 163-192.
(11) Joseph Maila, op. cit., p. 3.
2 For the "historical" dimension of the identity debate in Lebanon and a commentary on the Taif preamble, cf, Edmond Rabbath, "Wathiqat al-wifaq al-watani' wa ta'dil al- dustur", in Proche-Orient. Etudes Juridiques, No. 45-46 (1993). On the general question of identity in Lebanon, cf. in particular, Ahmad Beydoun, Identité confessionnelle et temps social chez les historiens libanais contemporains (Beirut: Publications de l'Universite Libanaise, 1984); Ghassan Salame, Lebanon's Injured Identities: Who Represents Whom During a Civil War (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1986); and Kamal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions. The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (London: Tauris, 1988).
(13) On the 1943 Pact, see Bassim al-Jisr, Mithaq 1943. Limadha Kan? Wa hal Saqat? (Beirut 1978); and Farid eI-Khazen, The Communal Pact of National identities. The Making and Politics of the 1943 National Pact (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1991).
(14) Article 95 of the Lebanese Constitution, as amended in 1990. (All references are to an English translation of the constitution, with all amendments since 1926, published by the Lebanese Ministry of Justice in 1995).
(15) Theodor Hanf, op. cit., p. 588.
(16) Cf. Article 65 of the Lebanese Constitution.
(17) Issues deemed "fundamental" are listed in Article 65 as follows: "Amendments to the constitution, the declaration of a state of emergency and its termination, war and peace, general mobilization, international agreements, the annual government budget, long-term comprehensive development plans, the appointment of employees of grade one and its equivalent, the reconsideration of administrative divisions, the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, electoral law, nationality law, personal status laws, and the dismissal of ministers."
(18) Article 57 of the Lebanese Constitution, op. cit.
(19) Cf. Article 19 of the Lebanese Constitution.
(20) Cf. Article 53 of the Lebanese Constitution.
(21) Cf. Article 56 of the Lebanese Constitution.
(22) Cf. Article 53, paragraph 2 of the Lebanese Constitution, op. cit
(23) Cf. Article 53, paragraph 4 of the Lebanese Constitution, op. cit.
(24) Cf. Article 53, paragraph 10 of the Lebanese Constitution, op. cit
(25) Joseph Maila, op. cit. pp. 58 and 59.
(26) Paul Salem, "Two years of Living Dangerously: General Awn and the Precarious Rise of Lebanon's 'Second Republic", in The Beirut Review, Vol. 1, No 1 (Spring 1996): p. 78.
(27) Edmond Rabbath, La constitution libanaise: Origines, textes et commentaires (Beirut: Libr. Orientale, 1982): p.365.
(28) Cf. Article 64 of the Lebanese Constitution.
(29) Cf. Article 44 of the Lebanese Constitution.
(30) Cf. Article 65, paragraph 4 and Article 77 of the Lebanese Constitution, op. cit.
(31) Cf Article 52, paragraph 2 of the Lebanese Constitution op. cit
(32)Section 1. Part 2. Article A. paragraph 4 and 5; and section 1, Part 3, Article C.
(33) Section 1, Part 3, Article B, paragraph 3 (C).
(34) Section 1, Part 3, Article A.
(35) Section 1, Part 3, Article B, parag. 2, 3 and 4.
(36) Section 1, Part 3, Article D.
(37) Regarding the ouster of the Awn Government, cf. generally Carole Dagher, Les Paris du Général (Beirut 1992); Annie Laurent, "A War Between Brothers: The Army-Lebanese Forces Showdown in East Beirut", in The Beirut Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1991); and Sarkis Na'um, Michael Awn: Hilm am wahm (Beirut 1992).
(38) See Wathiqat al-wifaq op. cit. Section 1, Part 2, Article A, paragraph 6.
(39) For a detailed appraisal of the 1992 legislative elections, see Farid El-Khazen and Paul Salem (eds.), Al-intikhabat al-'ula fi Lubnan ma ba'd al-harb, Al-arqam wa-I waqai' wa-l dalalat (Beirut: Dar al Nahar, 1993).
(40) Idem, p. 72.
(41) For a detailed appraisal of the 1996 legislative elections, cf. Al-Markaz al-Lubnani lil-dirasat (collective work), A1-intikhabat al-niyabiyya 1996 wa 'azmat aldimuqratiyya fi lubnan (Beirut 1998).
(42) For a discussion of such distortions and a critique of the Lebanese electoral system, cf. Nawaf Salam, Ab'ad min al-Taif Maqalatfi al-dawla wa-l Islah (Beirut: Dar al-Gadid, 1998), Chaps. 6 and 8.
(43) Malcom Kerr, 'Political Decision Making in a Confessional Democracy", in Leonard Binder, Politics in Lebanon (NY: Wiley, 1966), p. 190.
(44) Idem.
(45) Albert Mansour, Al-Inqilab 'ala al-Taif (Beirut 1993): pp. 188-189.
(46) Generally see, George Sa'ada, Qissati ma' al-Taif, (Beirut 1998).
(47) Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes (New York: New York University Press, 21997): p. 72.
(48) In analogy to Sartori's "minority appetites".